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DISCRIMINATION BY RAILROADS AND
OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES-PREFERENCES
TO PATRONS IN A GIVEN LOCALITY
I. BEVERLY LAKE*
INTRODUCTORY
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as discrimination between
localities in railroad or other utility rates. It is a convenient expression,
but one should remember that preferences are given to patrons, not
localities. By focusing attention on White and Brown instead of their
cities, states or regions it is easier to confine the discussion of their rates
to economic causes and results and to avoid muddying the waters with
civic or regional pride and jealousy. White is usually damaged less by
a preference to Brown who lives in another community than one to
Green in the next block. It is true that when a preference is given be-
cause of location the indirect results, both beneficial and injurious, are
more likely to extend to persons other than the patrons directly con-
cerned. These indirect results are exceedingly difficult to measure and
are apt to play a disproportionately important part in the condemnation
or approval of the rate differential.
Section Three of the Interstate Commerce Act' makes it unlawful
for any carrier to give any undue or unreasonable preference to any
"particular person, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point,
region, district, territory," or to subject any of these to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice. None of the quoted words after "locality"
appeared in the original Act. In Texas and Pacific Railway v. United
States2 the Supreme Court held New Orleans and Galveston were "local-
ities" so far as shipments of goods for consumption therein were con-
cerned but were not "localities" with reference to shipments to them for
export, so Section Three did not apply to the latter. Since no other
section applied, the decision set the railroads free to discriminate, even
unreasonably, between Brown shipping to* England through Galveston
and White shipping to England through New Orleans. Congress imme-
diately amended Section Three to extend it to ports and gateways. Had
Section Three stopped with a prohibition of any unreasonable preference
or prejudice to any person the confusion over what is a locality and the
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest College, Wake Forest, N. C. This article
is a portion of a dissertation submitted by the writer in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law at Columbia Univer-
sity, and will be part of a book to be published.
t49 F. C. A. §3(1).2289 U. S. 627, 638-646 (1933).
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invitation to unreasonable discrimination would have been avoided.
Nothing of great value would have been lost by the omission. The only
thing which it seems possible to say has been accomplished by inserting
"locality, gateway," etc., is to give a state or municipality the right to
institute proceedings, but this could be accomplished by an express pro-
vision to that effect.
In the early days of railroad regulation, when economic conditions
as well as laws were simpler, there was a legislative trend toward re-
quiring equal rates over all parts of the carrier's line for freight as well
as passengers, rates being measured only by distance and the nature of
the commodity.3 As railroads lengthened so as to serve a variety of
regions, and began to intersect and to compete, so simple a solution was
no longer practicable. The states abandoned these statutes and fol-
lowed the lead of Congress. In Section Two of the Interstate Com-
merce Act 4 there is a remnant of this "passion for equality."3  Section
Two forbids charging any person more or less than is charged another
for a like and contemporaneous service in transportation of a like kind
of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, which
last phrase the Supreme Court has confined to circumstances and con-
ditions relating directly to the transportation.0 Section Three applies
when the transportations are between different termini. It does not re-
quire absolute equality but forbids only unreasonable preferences or
prejudices. Even so there seems to be a carry-over of the older faith
in a uniform rate per ton per mile, so that a difference in the termini
of the two hauls is merely a fact to be considered in determining whether
to allow a differential.
If we stop thinking of localities as injured or favored parties and
think of locality only as a proposed reason for a preference, we are
brought to the same -sort of questions as when rates on different com-
modities are compared. What caused the railroad to make a higher
charge to Brown shipping a carload of overalls from Atlanta to Chicago
than to White shipping from Philadelphia to Chicago, the distance being
about the same ?7  Does it cost more to haul a car from Atlanta to
'See: Parker v. Great Westein Ry., 7 Man. & G. 253, 135 Eng. Reprint 107
(1844); Chi. & A. R. R. v. People, 67 Ill. 11 (1873); McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry.,
230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 1076 (1910) ; Chi. B. & Q. Ry. v. Anderson, 72 Neb. 856,
101 N. W. 1019 (1904); Hines v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 95 N. C. 434 (1886).
For a discussion of early attempts by Continental European countries to solve the
problem by such statutes see Gerrit L. Lansing, Discrimination in Railroad Rates
(1886) 28 PoP. Sc. MONTHLY 494.
4 49 F. C. A. §2.
See, Holmes, J., in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Tonopah & Tidewater
R. R., 248 U. S. 471, 475 (1919).
'I. C. C. v. B. & 0. R. R., 225 U. S. 326, 342 (1912).
"The rate on work clothing in carload lots from Macon, Georgia, to Chicago,
a distance of 817 miles, is $15.60 per thousand pounds as compared with a rate
of only $11.20 from Philadelphia to Chicago, a haul of 814 miles. From Omaha,
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Chicago? Is there a smaller volume of traffic between these cities so
that each carload must earn a greater portion of the overhead cost of
the railroad? Is there carrier competition at Philadelphia and none at
Atlanta so that the railroad must give a lower rate to White or lose his
business? Is the railroad trying to build up an industry in one locality
at the expense of another, and, if so, is it doing this to attract more
traffic to its line, or is it acting from motives not related to railroad in-
come? What is the effect of the discrimination? Would Brown's rate
be less if White's were raised? Does White use the preference to
undersell Brown and monopolize the market? Does the differential tend
to concentrate an industry in a small part of the country, and, if so, is
this bad? Does it make for lower wages in Brown's factory so as to
overcome the lower rate to White? Similar inquiries into cause and
effect are appropriate in the case of a non-carrier utility. That is, what
we should do in all cases is weigh the utility's explanation for the dis-
crimination. We begin with the simple slogan, All persons should be
served alike and at like rates. Then the utility points out differences in
the patrons-big and small volume, nature of the use of the service, kind
of business engaged in, weak and strong industries, influential or unim-
portant people, costly or less costly service, distance, locality, race, etc.
The question is, Which of these differences in patrons justifies a dif-
ference in rates and how much difference?
Assuming the two patrons ship the same kind of goods in carloads,
whether a case is governed by the absolute equality rule of Section Two
of the Interstate Commerce Act or by the unreasonable preference rule
of Section Three depends upon the meaning given "like service" in Sec-
tion Two and "locality" in Section Three. In Wight v. United States
the railroad hauled beer from Cincinnati to Pittsburgh for two dealers,
one of whom had a warehouse on the siding of a rival road while the
warehouse of the other was on neither. The first dealer was given free
cartage from the station to his warehouse, thus, in effect, getting a lower
rate. The court held this was governed by and a violation of Section
Nebraska, to Columbus, Ohio, a distance of 748 miles, the comparable rate is
$18.70 per thousand pounds while the rate is $15.20 from Fitchburg, Massachu-
setts, to Columbus, a distance of 743 miles. From Denver, Colorado, to Evans-
ville, Indiana, a distance of 1,083 miles, the freight rate is $29.40 per thousand
pounds as compared with a rate of $18.40 from New London, Connecticut, to Evans-
ville, a distance of 1,088 miles." WENDELL BERGE, EcoNoMIc FREEDOM FOR THE
WESr (1946) p. 108.
For other illustrations of wide discrepancies in rates on the same commodity
moving to a common market from Atlanta and practically equidistant points of
origin in the East, see Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I. C. C. 447, 567 (1945) ;
and the plaintiff's trial brief in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et als., in the
Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1945. Of course, many of
these illustrations involve a comparison of rates of different railroads.
167 U. S. 512 (1897). See also, Public Serv. Comm. v. N. Pac. Ry., 77
Wash. 635, 138 Pac. 270 (1914); and S. A. L. Ry. v. United States, 254 U. S.
57 (1920).
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Two. Thus, the test is not the location of the two shippers' factories,
but whether the services rendered by the railroad in return for the rate
(the line haul) began and ended at the same places.
Even when the termini are different the services may be treated as
if they were the same. Equality of rates where there is unequal service
is as truly discrimination as unequal rates for equal services. In an
early English case9 it was said:
"The effect of such a scale of charges is to diminish the natural advan-
tages which the position of the dealers at Ipswich, by reason of its
greater proximity, gives them over the dealers at Peterborough in re-
spect of traffic at Thurston, etc., by annihilating, in point of expense of
carriage, a certain portion of the distance between Peterborough and
those places; and just in proportion by which that natural advantage is
diminished, an undue disadvantage is brought upon the complainants and
other Ipswich dealers."
However it is not feasible to vary rates in accordance with each minute
variation in the service or its cost. Even if it were possible to calculate
the cost per mile of haul accurately and if all miles were uniform in
cost, a strict distance tariff would be unworkable. The best illustration
is perhaps in the case of street car fares. The person riding five miles
pays the same as one riding five blocks. Again, it is customary to
charge the same for water, electricity or gas throughout the city, though
it is somewhat more expensive to serve the inhabitants of the outer edges.
Switch districts are established by railroads at the large terminals, and
cars are moved anywhere within such district for a flat rate.10 Rail-
roads frequently establish blanket areas, charging the same line haul
rate between the distant outside point and any point within the area. 1
In all these cases what we are really doing is weighing the con-
venience to the utility of having a flat rate instead of a myriad of indi-
vidual rates against the consequences to the person getting the smaller
service. The injury being slight in comparison with the reason we say
the patrons receive the same service; that is, there is no difference in
locality.12 When the consequence to one just outside the flat rate district
overbalances the benefit to the utility from the higher rate to him, we
say the area limits must be extended,1 3 but when the consequences to
'Ransome v. East Counties Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 135, 140 Eng. Rep. 1034(1858).10 See, for example: Alton R. R. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 382 Ill. 478, 48 N. E.
(2d) 381 (1943) ; State ex rel. Burr v. A. C. L. R. R., 96 Fla. 646, 119 So. 110(1928).
"1See, for example: United States v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1924);
Zenith Sand Co. v. P. S. Comm., 108 W. Va. 413, 151 S. E. 433 (1930).
" City of Milwaukee v. R. R. Comm., 206 Wis. 339, 240 N. W. 165 (1932).
10 United States v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1924) ; State ex rel. Burr v.
A. C. L. R. R., 96 Fla. 646, 119 So. 110 (1928); City of Montgomery v. Green,
180 Ala. 322, 60 So. 900 (1913); Il. Commerce Comm. v. Chi. & E. I. Ry., 332
Ill. 243, 163 N. E. 664 (1928).
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him are not serious we say the services are not the same; that is, the
localities are different.' 4
It does not matter whether we say Section Two requires the same
rate because the patrons are in the same locality and receive the same
service, or say they are in different localities but Section Three forbids
a different rate because unreasonable since the cost of serving is the
same and a different rate would be a hardship. Indeed, it may be
doubted that under Section Two any desirable result is reached which
could not be reached under Section Three's prohibition of undue and
unreasonable preferences.
SUBURBAN COMMUTERS
It has become customary for railroads to offer to passengers travel-
ing betwen a city and its suburbs multiple-trip tickets at less than the
single trip rate. Section Twenty-two of the Interstate Commerce Act15
provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed to forbid the issue
of commutation tickets, but this merely saves them from the prohibition
of Section Two and leaves them subject to attack under Section Three.'0
The Missouri court, reversing an injunction against commutation rates
because unreasonably discriminatory, said:
"The suburban or commutation ticket service is a special service ren-
dered by roads entering large cities, and differs in many respects from
other passenger traffic. It is a service devoted primarily to those who
have their homes in communities adjacent to large cities, but work or
carry on their business in the city, and who regularly and daily use that
service and are wholesale purchasers of transportation. It is related,
also, to the fact that such communities often are built up as a result of
and in reliance upon such service at mileage rates less than those exacted
for ordinary passenger service."'17
The Georgia court held unreasonableness of a railroad's refusal to estab-
lish a commutation rate to one suburb was not shown by proof that it
had such rates to another.s On the other hand the Oregon court has
said that "like service" need not be between the same termini so a
carrier may be required to extend commutation rates to another suburb
nearer the city than the first, the higher rate having injured real estate
values in the unfavored suburb.' 9 In Washington a railroad, having
4 See: Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 133, 102 Pac. (2d)
759 (1940); Village of Fox Point v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 242 Wis. 97, 7 N. W.
(2d) 571 (1943); Youngman v. Comrs. of Waterworks, 267 Pa. 490, 110 Atl. 174(1920).
249 F. C. A. §22(1).
" See: N. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Tennessee, 262 U. S. 318, 323 (1923).
1" State v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 321 Mo. 297, 10 S. W. (2d) 946, 951 (1928).
Italics added.
"'Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. A. & W. P. R. R., 164 Ga. 822, 139 S. E. 725
(1927).1' Portland R., P. & L. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Ore., 56 Ore. 468, 105 Pac. 709
(1909), aff'd on rehearing, 56 Ore. 468, 109 Pac. 273 (1910), and no error found,
229 U. S. 397 (1913).
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established such rates and finding them not remunerative, undertook to
raise them so much that suburbanites began to move back into the city.
The order of the Commission allowing the increase to the more distant
points but not to points within ten miles of the city was upheld against
the contention that it required the very sort of unjust discrimination
prohibited by the state constitution, the court saying:
"It is an adaptation of rates to meet certain economic and industrial
conditions in certain localities, but which has a like effect upon all who
are similarly situated. In order to constitute an unjust discrimination
the railway company would have to receive a greater or less rate from
one person than another to whom it furnishes a like service under like
conditions .... ",20
While recognizing that some reduction in rates to commuters to nearby
suburbs may be justified, a New York court refused to sustain an order
requiring the railroad to continue such rates if not remunerative, saying,
".It is difficult to see why a passenger traveling from New Haven to
Boston should pay more than the service is worth because the com-
muters from Mount Vernon to New York are carried by the company
at an actual loss. ' '21
The United States Supreme Court in sustaining a state revision
downward of commutation rates voluntarily established said the service
is "quite different" from the regular passenger service in that the com-
muter purchases tickets for several rides at one time.2 2 It is difficult
to see wherein the service to a commuter differs from that rendered the
single trip passenger riding between the same towns and occupying the
adjoining seat. The money saved in printing and selling the tickets is
probably insignificant. The real explanation for the preference to the
commuter is, as the Missouri court said, that the commuters "regularly
and daily use that service and are wholesale purchasers of transporta-
tion" and they will not use it at a higher rate. Unless the carrier has
enticed people to settle in a suburb and then has undertaken to take
away the low rate, the cases seem to allow it to fix the limit of the
commutation zone at the point where a further extension would not
be likely to attract regular business. Commuting rates do not cause
long distance travelers to pay more unless they yield less than the out-
of-pocket cost of service or unless enough of the commuter traffic could
be retained at a higher rate to yield a greater total revenue than does
the pre~ent rate. From the commuter cases it would appear, then, that
the test of a preference because of locality is not whether the unfavored
"Puget Sound El. Ry. v. R. R. Comm. of Wash., 65 Wash. 75, 117 Pac. 739(1911).2 People v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 159 App. Div. 531, 145 N. Y. S. 503, 509(1914), aff'd, 215 N. Y. 689, 109 N. E. 1089.
' Pa. R. R. v. Towers. 245 U. S. 6, 11 (1917).
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patron would be in a better position if he were charged the lower rate,
but is two-fold: First, did the carrier have a sound business reason for
giving the preference? Second, is the unfavored patron in a worse
position than he would have been in had the preference not been granted?
He is not if the preference was no more than necessary to meet com-
petition for the preferred patron's business.
CARRIER-MADE PREFERENCES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP INDUSTRIES
IN THE CARRIER'S TERRITORY
In Union Pacific Railway v. Goodridge20 3 the United States Supreme
Court said of a Colorado statute like Section Two of the Interstate
Commerce Act: "The statute recognizes the fact that it is no proper
business of a common carrier to foster particular enterprises or to build
up new businesses." In that case it would have been sufficient to say:
Regardless of the carrier's interest in developing new businesses the
statute forbids it to do so by rates different from those charged other
people shipping like goods between the same termini. Such a statute
does not apply when the patrons ship between different places. In that
event Section Three governs. It does not forbid a reasonable differ-
ential; that is, one for which the carrier can give a good reason. Noth-
ing else appearing, it would seem that anything is a part of the "proper
business" of a carrier, and a good reason for a differential, which is
likely to increase the carrier's own revenues. New businesses springing
up along its right of way are quite likely to have that effect. Whether
this is a sufficient reason for a preferential rate depends upon the con-
sequences to shippers between other termini.
The problem is presented in two Missouri cases in which the court
quoted this statement in the Goodridge case.2 4 In the first case the
complainant's customers were going to neighboring towns to buy be-
cause the stores there were able to undersell the complainant, by reason
of more favorable rates from St. Louis, the common source of supply.
The injury to the complainant might well be sufficient to make the dif-
ferential unreasonable and to justify an order requiring the extension
of the low rate to him. In the second case the railroad to induce the
plaintiff to build his proposed new mill on its line, contracted to give
him a rebate on machinery shipped interstate at published rates. The
contract was properly held unenforceable because Section Six of the
Interstate Commerce Act25 forbids any departure from the published
tariff. Had the railroad, instead of undertaking to give a secret rebate,
published a preferential rate to the new town, such rate might have
2-149 U. S. 680, 690 (1893).
", Cohn v. St. L., I. M., and S. Ry., 181 Mo. 30, 79 S. W. 961 (1904) ; Foster
Lumber Co. v. A., T., & S. F. Ry., 270 Mo. 629, 194 S. W. 281 (1917).
2549 F. C. A. §6.
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caused no injury to any other patron of the road. If so, it would seem
not unreasonable.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has said recently26 that a com-
plainant is unduly prejudiced by a lower rate to his rival on raw mate-
rials enabling the rival to get a monopoly on the foreign market so as
to counterbalance the complainant's advantage in being much nearer the
domestic market. According to the Commission the complainant's ad-
vantage in outbound rates is no more justification for a higher inbound
rate than his lower manufacturing costs due to good management in his
plant would be. That is, while the carrier has a legitimate interest in
keeping the favored factory in business so that it will continue to handle
its shipments of raw materials, it cannot accomplish this by a rate which
excludes another patron from a market he could otherwise reach.
When a carrier sets a low rate on the product of certain mines in one
district in order to enable them to compete with mines in another, it
must give that rate to all mines in the first district even though some,
by reason of the superior quality of their product, do not need it in
order to compete in the common market.27 This is not because it is no
part of the railroad's "proper business" to set rates so freight can move
from the poorly located district, but because Section Two requires equal
rates, without regard to reasonableness, whenever the two patrons ship
like goods between the same places. Having attended to its "proper
business" by establishing a rate enabling it to get the maximum volume
of traffic from the mines along its track, the railroad must, because of
Section Two, give that rate to all who ship the same ore from that
point, the entire district being regarded as one locality.
In a Kansas case28 the court said a lower rate per mile on coal to
towns in the salt producing district than to a town slightly beyond it
was an unreasonable discrimination, traffic conditions being similar. The
reason for the lower rate to the salt towns was that the salt produced,
95 per cent of the cost of producing which was the cost of coal, would
be shipped out over the railroad. If this low rate was necessary to keep
the salt industry at work, no harm was done the consignees of coal in
the other town for they did not compete with the salt towns and their
rates were not made higher than they would have been without the con-
cession. The court seems to have proceeded on the theory that the salt
. town rate shows what is reasonable, for the railroad would not charge
a non-compensatory rate voluntarily. While comparison of a rate with
other rates to determine its reasonableness per se is sound as a basic
principle, it is not an infallible test. The railroad might well be willing
" Ecusta Paper Corp. v. Alton R. R., 262 I. C. C. 330 (1945).
21 Phila. & Read. Ry. v. I. C. C., 174 Fed. 687 (E. D. Pa. 1909).
"Union Pac. Ry. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 95 Kan. 604, 148 Pac. 667 (1915).
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to sacrifice part of its normal profit on hauling coal in order to make a
larger profit on longer hauls of salt, especially when to charge the normal
rate on coal would shut down the salt industry, for the normal rate on
coal yields no profit at all if the consumer abandons his business and
ships neither coal nor salt.
An illustration, both of the right of the carrier to set rates so as to
enable mines along its road to compete and of the complex problems
which can arise from a seemingly simple rate adjustment, is found in
litigation over rates from Indiana coal mines to Chicago. Mines in
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana and Illinois compete
for this market. Freight rates on coal are high in proportion to value,
so they play a large part in a mine's ability to compete. The Illinois
mines applied for a reduction in their rates, contending the existing
rates discriminated in favor of mines in the other states. The evidence
showed the existing rates handicapped the Illinois mines and that busi-
ness and social conditions in the Illinois mining district were deplorable.
The state commission lowered the rates, its action was sustained by the
Illinois court, the new rate being somewhat remunerative.3 The Inter-
state Commerce Commission found no discrimination againsf interstate
commerce and refused to order the old rate restored,30 but thereafter it
lowered the rate from the Kentucky mines so as to restore them to their
former competitive position with the Illinois mines. Under these rates
in two years Illinois mines increased their shipments to Chicago to 245
per cent of their previous volume while the shipments from the Indiana
mines to the Chicago area were only 39 per cent of what they had been.
The Milwaukee road carried about 95 per cent of the coal going from
the Indiana mines to Chicago. To recover some of the business it had
lost it reduced its rate to a point below the maximum limit of reason-
ableness but above the minimum limit; that is, the new rate would yield
the railroad some profit. Because of greater distance it was still a bit
higher in the aggregate than the joint rate from the Illinois mines, in
which joint rate the Milwaukee had been required to join. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission suspended the proposed tariff, but enforce-
ment of its order was enjoined.31 The district court held the railroad
has the right, within reason, to set rates to obtain or retain desired
traffic.32 On appeal the Supreme Court said that the fact that the change
would disrupt the existing situation is not conclusive for all changes do
that, nor was the possibility of a rate war between the railroads ground
2 A., T., & S. F. Ry. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 70, 166 N. E. 466(1929).3 I. C. C. Docket Number 23130.31 Chi., M., St. P. & Pac. R. R. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 970 (N. D. Ill.
1934), aff'd, 294 U. S. 499 (1935).2 See also: State v. P. S. Comm., 112 Wash. 520, 192 Pac. 1075 (1920) ; Laurel
Cotton Mills v. Gulf & S. I. R. R., 84 Miss. 339, 37 So. 134 (1904).
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to suspend this rate, which in itself was not unreasonable, for the Com-
mission could prevenit a rate war's getting out of control.
In the previously mentioned Texas and Pacific case" the question
was whether the railroad which reached New Orleans direct, and served
Galveston in conjunction with other roads, could maintain export-import
rates from New Orleans as low as the rates it and the connecting road
maintained to Galveston, Galveston being considerably -nearer to the
Texas points from which the export shipments originated and to which
the imports were destined. Galveston contended it was being deprived
of the natural advantage of its location by equal rates for unequal service
-as true discrimination as is unequal rates for equal service.3 4 After
remarking that long before the Act the railroads habitually so equalized
rates between near and distant ports when necessary to compete with
other-routes available to the shipper, Justice Roberts said :3
"The theory of the Act is that the carriers in initiating rates may adjust
them to competitive conditions, and that such action does not amount to
undue discrimination. While the carriers may, therefore, meet compe-
tition by equalizing rates or maintaining differentials both to interior
points and to ports, they may not adjust their rates with the motive of
injuring or aiding a shipper, a particular kind of traffic, or a locality,
for so to do is to depart from the transportation standard, conformity
to which the Act contemplates, and substitute others which are prohib-
ited. A tariff published for the purpose of destroying a market or build-
ing up one, of diverting traffic from a particular place to the injury of
that place, or in aid of some other, is unlawful; and obviously, what the
carrier may not lawfully do, the Commission may not compel."
The strong dissent of Justice Stone was not directed against this general
proposition 3 6 It is by no means clear how a carrier can' have the pur-
pose of attracting to itself, and the ports served by it, traffic which
otherwise would go to other ports and carriers, without at the same time
having the purpose to divert such traffic from such other ports and roads
with the necessary injury to them. Possibly the statement means that
if the carrier's motive is malicious injury or is otherwise not connected
with increasing the carrier's revenues the differential is an unreasonable
discrimination. Unquestionably this would be true. Probably Justice
Roberts would have found an improper discrimination if a differential
actually resulted in stagnation of business at the unfavored, previously
prosperous community, but this is, in reality, abandoning the carrier's
motive and substituting the effects of its action as the test of reason-
ableness--a desirable substitution.
It should be noted that the New Orleans rate did no injury to the
Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1933).
3, See dissenting opinion of Justice Stone at page 656.
Pages 636-7 of the official report.
, Page 662 of the official report.
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shipper or the consumer, but, on the contrary, gave them a choice be-
tween two ports at the same price. We may also take notice of the fact
that the port of Galveston was not put out of business,3 7 though justice
Stone, dissenting, infers gross injury was done to it.38 The existing
rate relation enabled export-import traffic from and to interior Texas to
move either through Galveston or through New Orleans. The rate rela-
tion sought by Galveston would have caused practically all of this traffic
to move through its port. The complainant whose quarrel with the
existing situation is that it deprives him of a monopoly is not in a very
strong position. The Minnesota court has held that the operator of a
gravel pit near a highway construction project was not injured by a rate
to a distant pit actually higher than his own rate but lower in proportion
to distance.3 9 The English courts came to the opposite conclusion in the
early days of railroading.40 There is clearly an injury to the shipper
who is deprived of the natural advantage of his location, but if the only
injury is the loss of a monopoly the public welfare swings over into the
carrier's side of the scales and together with the carrier's interest in
building up its own revenues, may outweigh the injury done the near-by
shipper. Just the reverse should be the result when shipper White in
Town A is given a rate enabling him to compete with Black in Town B
for the markets near B, but Black is given no corresponding differential
enabling him to compete for markets near A. That is the situation
which the shippers of manufactured goods from southern and western
states say confronts them today. They cannot compete for the eastern
markets but eastern manufacturers can compete for markets in the South
and West.
Justice Roberts' statement in the Galveston-New Orleans case that
"obviously, what the carrier may not lawfully do, the Commission may
not compel" may or may not be sound, but certainly it was inapplicable
to the issue in that case. The Commission asserted that Section Three
gave it authority to make the order. What Section Three makes it
unlawful for the carrier to do is to discriminate without reason. What
the Commission was doing was not discrimination at all but the removal
of a discrimination by restoring to Galveston the advantage of its loca-
cation.41 Even if circumstances exist which would make discrimination
"In I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R., 118 Fed. 613 (S. D. Ga. 1902), a differential
giving one port a monopoly was held unreasonable.
" Page 657 of the official report.
" Hallet Constr. Co. v. Foley Bros., 191 Minn. 335, 254 N. W. 435 (1934).
See also, Parker, Cir. J., in Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462,
471 (S. D. W. Va. 1928).
,o Ransome v. East Counties Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 135, 140 Eng. Rep. 1034(1838).
"' Since the court found the defendant railroad had no control over the Gal-
veston rate this was not in reality a case of discrimination by the defendant
railroad.
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by the carrier reasonable, the Commission in forbidding such discrimina-
tion is not itself discriminating in violation of Section Three.42 The
attack on its action must rest on some other ground such as (1) the
Act in forbidding discrimination without a good reason impliedly author-
izes discrimination with a good reason and what the statute permits the
Commission cannot forbid, or (2) an interference with a reasonable dis-
crimination is an infringement of the carrier's liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause. Perhaps, in the final analysis, these two possible
lines of attack converge, since the test of reasonableness of a carrier-
made differential calls for a balancing of the carrier's interest in increas-
ing its revenues and the benefits to the preferred patrons against injuries
done to other patrons, and, through them, to the public.
There are instances in which the regulatory commission sets rates
which are preferential to shippers to or from a given locality, so we are
required to consider the correctness of Justice Roberts' statement. The
Interstate Commerce Commission is given authority to set rates in cer-
tain situations by Section Fifteen of the Interstate Commerce Act.4
2 "
This provides:
"Whenever, after full hearing, the commission shall be of opinion that
any individual or joint rate is or will be unjust or unreasonable or un-
justly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of any of the provisions
of this chapter, the commission is authorized and empowered to deter-
mine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable individual or
joint rate to be thereafter observed in such case."
Thus, the power of the Commission under this section is conditioned
upon a finding that existing rates are unreasonable, unjustly discrim-
inatory, or otherwise in violation of the Act. Unless there is a fair
basis for such a finding it has no statutory authority to set the rate at
any figure,43 but since the finding of the Commission will be accepted
if there is substantial evidence to support it, and in absence of an error
of law,44 and there can usually be collected and introduced considerable
evidence of injurious consequences flowing from any given rate adjust-
ment between competitors in different localities, this condition is not
" "If [the existing system of rates is] old, interests will probably become at-
tached to them, and, it may be, will be disturbed or disordered if they be changed.
Such circumstances is, of course, proper to be considered and constitutes an ele-
ment in the problem of regulation, but it does not take jurisdiction away to enter-
tain and attempt to resolve the problem." McKenna, J., in I. C. C. v. Chi., R. I.,
and P. Ry., 218 U. S. 88. 108 (1910).
4249 F. C. A. §15(1).
42I. C. C. v. Stickney, 215 U. S. 98, 105 (1909).
"United States v. L. & N. 1. R., 235 U. S. 314, 320 (1914) ; United States v.
Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344, 352 (1940) ; United States v. Illinois
Central R. R., 263 U. S. 515, 526 (1924); Manufacturers' Ry. v. United States,
246 U. S. 457, 481 (1918); I. C. C. v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 547




very difficult to overcome if the Commission is reasonably careful in
writing its opinion. Then, having established the Commission's author-
ity to set the just and reasonable rate, the question becomes whether it
has done so. Again the presumption offers support to the Commission's
conclusion. 45 The Commission in exercising its power under Section
Fifteen must consider the effect of the rate so fixed upon the carrier
for which it is prescribed and the public interest in adequate transporta-
tion at low cost.46
In the previously mentioned Illinois decision sustaining the reduction
of the rate from Illinois mines to Chicago the court said the economic
conditions in the mining district were to be considered though the Com-
mission could not base a rate reduction order solely on the need of the
Illinois mines.4 7  Texas, however, has sustained an order requiring
preferential rates to shipments of livestock feed into a drought stricken
area solely because of the need of the cattle raisers and the public interest
in maintaining the industry in the area,48 and when the Interstate Com-
merce Commission found it necessary to raise rates on salt from the
Detroit area in order to produce needed revenue for the railroad serving
those mines, it was held that it could raise rates on shipments from the
Louisiana mines to the Chicago area in order to prevent the Detroit pro-
ducers from being driven from the market.49  Similarly, Washington
required the continuance of commutation rates to suburbs because of
the need for such rates even though they did not yield a fair return
and were said to discriminate against inhabitants of more distant sub-
urbs.50 Again, over the objection of Justice McKenna that the order
was discriminatory in that it did away with natural advantages, the
Supreme Court sustained the Interstate Commerce Commission in limit-
ing, in a time of car shortage, a mine located on two railroads to the
number of cars it would have gotten had it been on one only.51
The Lake Cargo Coal case52 is the leading decision on the power of
the Interstate Commerce Commission to set rate differentials for the
purpose of equalizing competitive conditions. "Lake cargo" coal is coal
'II. C. C. v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry., 218 U. S. 88 (1910). ,
INTERsTATE COmmERcE AcT §15A, 49 F. C. A. §15A, as amended in 1940 by
54 STAT. §912.
17 A., T., & S. F. Ry. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 70, 166 N. E. 466(1929).
" Abilene & So. Ry. v. Terrell, 131 S. W. (2d) 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
" Jefferson Island Salt Min. Co. v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 315 (N. D. Ohio
1925).50Puget Sound El. Ry. v. R. R. Comm. of Wash., 65 Wash. 75, 117 Pac. 739(1911).
'United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533 (1924).
"Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928),
reversed, 279 U. S. 812 (1929) solely on the ground that pending the appeal sub-
sequent developments had made the case moot and no longer a proper subject forjudicial action, and cited with approval by Justice Roberts in Tex. & Fac. Ry. v.
United States, 289 U. S. 627, 638 (1933).
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shipped from the mines to the Great Lakes for further shipment across
the lakes to various ports in Canada and the United States. Since the
movement occurs during the summer, a normally slack season at the
mines, this market is highly competitive and a few cents per ton differ-
ence in freight rates will throw the trade to the favored mines. Prior
to any action by the Commission the railroads set the differential at
9 cents in favor of the Pennsylvania-Ohio mines as against the more
distant West Virginia-Kentucky-Tennessee district. A rate approach-
ing anything like a distance scale would completely exclude the latter
from the market. The Commission over the years conducted a series
of investigations and hearings, 5" first increasing the differential to 25
cents. Finding that notwithstanding the 25 cents differential the south-
ern mines had increased their proportion of the total lake shipments
from 39.6 per cent to 82 per cent, they being able to do this because of
their considerably lower cost of production, the Commission allowed a
20 cents reduction in the rate from the northern mines; that is, it in-
creased the differential in favor of the northern mines to 45 cents. The
railroads serving the southern mines then filed a new rate schedule
lowering their rates by 20 cents, which would have the effect of restor-
ing the old 25 cents differential. Although the proposed rate was not
below the minimum limit of reasonableness and so did not have the
effect of throwing an added burden upon other patrons of the railroads
proposing it, the Commission, on the protests of the northern mine
operators, suspended the new tariff, and, after hearing, cancelled it.
Thereupon, the Anchor Coal Company, a southern mine operator, sued
to enjoin the enforcement of the Commission's order. The three-judge
district court granted the injunction on the ground that the Commission
had no authority to set rates for the purpose of overcoming the produc-
tion advantages of one district so as to allow the handicapped district's
mines to compete, and also on the ground that there had been errors
as to the burden of proof.
The following excerpts from the lengthy opinion of Circuit Judge
Parker seem to summarize the court's views :54
"It must be manifest that increasing the differential to meet such a
situation is not regulation of rates, but regulation of industrial condi-
tions under the guise of regulating rates. It means nothing more nor
less than that, because one community is able to produce coal more
cheaply than another, and thereby get a large share of the business
which has been going to the other even though paying a considerable
differential in freight, the Commission is placing upon it a handicap by
increasing the differential in rates and thereby equalizing the advantage
which it has in a low cost of production. It matters not what this may
" For the series of hearings and orders by the commission see: 22 I. C. C. 604;
22 I. C. C. 640; 24 1. C. C. 280; 101 1. C. C. 513; 126 I. C. C. 344.
' Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, cited supra note 52, at 470-474.
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be called, it is in essence a regulation of industrial conditions through
manipulation of rates."
"How could a competitor who is complaining be injured by a rate
higher than his rate? The question answers itself. He could not be
injured by the higher rate."
"The Commission does not have the right . . .to regulate industrial
conditions under the guise of regulating rates .... The Commission is
given power to determine and prescribe 'what will be the just and reason-
able rate... to be thereafter observed... or the maximum or minimum,
or maximum and minimum to be charged.' ... But nowhere is it provided
that in doing so the Commission may prefer one section of the country
over another, or that it may fix rates, or may prevent the fixing of rates
by the carriers, with a view of placing competing producers upon an
equality or of compensating for disadvantages under which competing
communities may labor. Manifestly such a power is not conferred by the
statutes referred to55 for rates fixed with such an end in view are not
'reasonable,' but are unreasonable and constitute an unprecedented inter-
ference with the industrial conditions of the country."'56
"If the Commission has the right in a rate adjustment to consider the
shift in traffic to a community already paying a higher rate, and act upon
it as one of the factors in still further widening the rate differential, its
power to control the economic development of the country is practically
unlimited. The shift in cotton manufacturing, in fruit growing, in
furniture manufacturing, in short in every branch of industry, will
become a matter for consideration by the Commission; for all depend
upon freight rates, all have rates in which the differential between long
and short hauls is narrow, and all experience periods when there are
shifts of traffic from one section to another, due to varying industrial
conditions. We feel perfectly certain that Congress did not intend to
vest such power in the Commission."
Sections 1, 3, and 15 of the INTERSTATE COMMEzcE Ace, 49 F. C. A. §§1, 3,
and 15.
5 Judge Parker here quotes the following authorities in support of his position:
Commissioner Franklin K. Lane, in Ashland Fire Brick Case, 22 I. C. C. 115,
121: "It seems unnecessary here to state that the power has not been lodged with
this tribunal to equalize economic advantages, to place one market in competition
with another, or to treat all railroads as a part of one great whole." Justice Holmes,
in I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 46 (1911): The Interstate Commerce
Act "does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunities or abilities." Justice.
Brandeis, in United States v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 263 U. S. 515, 524 (1924) : "The
law does not- attempt to equalize opportunities among localities."
To these might be added: Justice McKenna, in I. C. C. v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry.,
218 U. S. 88, 102 (1910) : "The Commission was instituted to prevent discrimina-
tion between persons and places. It would indeed be an abuse of its powers to
exercise them so as to cause either." And see similar statements in: A. C. L.
R. R. v. Trammell, 287 Fed. 741 (N. D. Ga. 1923); Sou. Ry. v. Atlanta Stove
Wks., 128 Ga. 207, '57 S. E. 429 (1907); A., T., & S. F. Ry. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm., 335 Ill. 70, 166 N. E. 466 (1929); Ind. Harbor Belt R. R. v. Illinois Com-
merce Comm., 340 II. 304, 172 N. E. 708 (1930); Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. v. R. R.
Comm. of La., 137 La. 747, 69 So. 161 (1915); Cincinnati Nor. R. R. v. P. U.
Comm. of Oh., 116 Oh. St. 397, 156 N. E. 506 (1927); Pa. R. R. v. Pa. P. U.
Comm., 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 5, 4 At. (2d) 622 (1939); State v. P. S. Comm., 112
Wash. 520, 192 Pac. 1075 (1920).
In many of these cases the courts sustained the action of the commission be-
cause not designed to control competition.
1947]
288 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
The failure of Congress to amend the Act in the eighteen years
which have intervened indicates that Judge Parker was correct in his
view that Congress did not intend for the Commission to fix rates solely
to counteract natural advantages in the competitive race. However,
since the injunction was promptly reversed by the Supreme Court"7 on
the ground that pending the appeal the matter had become moot, there
was not the pressure upon Congress for an amendment that might have
developed had the injuction remained in effect, and the silence of Con-
gress is less impressive than it otherwise would be.
The trouble with Judge Parker's decision is that the net result was
not the free and equal competition he seems to have desired, with the
prize going to the producer of the best goods at the cheapest cost. On
the contrary it resulted in a fixed race with the prize going to the south-
ern mines many miles farther from the market. Despite his assertion
that the northern mines could not be injured by a southern rate 25 cents
higher than their own, the contrary is true. The normal rate would be
a rate measured by distance. There is little doubt that the southern
mines' rate would have been higher had there been no northern mines.
It was set low to enable the southern mines to overcome the distance
advantage of those in the north. The shift of the "lake cargo" coal
traffic from 39 per cent from the southern mines to 82 per cent from
the southern mines shows the differential went too far and practically
enabled the southern mines to drive the nearer mines from the market.
If, as is true, the southern mines were entitled to the advantage of
their lower production costs and a rate differential cannot be set to
deprive them of it, it would seem that the northern mines are entitled
to the advantage of their location. Had the rates been set on anything
approaching a distance basis the southern mines would have retained
their advantage of low production costs but would have been completely
shut out of the market nevertheless. Therefore, the higher rate to the
southern mines injured the northern mines in that it was not high
enough to preserve the northern mines' geographical advantage. The
decision does not substitute a free economy for a planned economy. It
substitutes a railroad-and-court planned economy for a Commission-
planned economy. It may well be that the railroad-court plan is a
better plan-at least it allowed the consumers to buy from two groups
of mines-but it is well to recognize that it is a plan. It is possible to
believe that the Commission is a better informed and more public-minded
planner than the railroad, though that is by no means a certainty.
It might be argued that in dealing with the Commission's power fo
set differentials the Act does not mean the same thing as when limiting
the power of the carrier; that although the Commission's power under
" 279 U. S. 812 (1929).
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Section Fifteen is to set a "reasonable" rate and the railroad is forbidden
to fix an "unreasonable" differential, the reasonableness of the carrier's
and the Commission's action may be measured by different standards.58
However, this would be straining the words of the Act. Notwithstand-
ing the swing toward a governmentally planned economy which has
taken place since the Lake Cargo case it would be a radical departure
from American tradition to empower a commission, however com-
petent, to control the location of factories by fixing rates to markets, or
otherwise. Such a departure from tradition is not to be implied from
language in a statute susceptible of a different meaning. Nevertheless,
giving the Commission power to consider industrial needs in handi-
capped sections in determining reasonableness of rate differentials would
not, as Judge Parker thought, give the Commission "practically unlim-
ited" control over the economic development of the country, since it
would not do away with the limiting effect of "reasonable." It would
merely permit the Commission to say it is doing what it very likely does
now without saying so. Whether the Commission initiates a rate dif-
ferential or approves or disallows one initiated by the carrier, it defi-
nitely is affecting the economic life of the communities. Since it is
doing so in any event it might be wise to consider this effect deliberately
and try to weigh it along with the other arguments for or against the
differential.
While Judge Parker was probably correct in his interpretation of
the Act, he seems to have gone too far in saying, "We do not think
Congress could give such power to the Commission."59  As authority
he cites only Hammer v. Dagenhart,60 since overruled by United States
v. Darby.61 There is no insurmountable difficulty so far as delegation
of legislative power is concerned. The remaining objections would have
to do with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Though
that amendment contains no Equal Protection Clause, it may be that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would forbid a classifica-
tion by Congress which would be beyond a state's power under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth. If so, a rate differential
set by Congress or its Commission would be open to constitutional at-
tack by a shipper discriminated against. If the entire rate schedule
enables the railroad to earn a fair return on its entire investment neither
the entire schedule nor any single rate therein confiscates the railroad's
property. The railroad's constitutional attack on a differential must be
that the rate order is an arbitrary interference with its freedom of man-
" The phrase "similar circumstances and conditions" was held to have one
meaning in Section Two and another in Section Four. I. C. C. v. Ala. Midland
Ry., 168 U. S. 144 (1897).
, Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462, 472 (S. D. W. Va. 1928).00 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
41312 U. S. 100 (1941).
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agement, which it is not if there was a good reason for the classification
of the patrons. That is, the railroad's attack would be of the same
nature as the attack by the disfavored shipper-the differential is an
arbitrary classification. But, whether a classification is arbitrary de-
pends upon a weighing of all conflicting interests. If the public has an
interest in scattering the plants of a given industry all over the country,
or in concentrating them in a small area, surely such an interest may
outweigh those of operators of existing plants sufficiently to justify a
rate differential making such a scattering or concentration possible. For
example, it might be thought that national safety against sudden air
attack demands a decentralization of the steel industry. One way to
bring this about would be by a direct subsidy to plants in less favorable
areas. Another would be by an indirect subsidy in the form of rate
differentials. Whether Congress could use the second method would
seem to be not susceptible of a flat yes or no answer but to require a
balancing of interests in each case.
The City of Galveston has had a long struggle with its neighbor,
Houston. Originally Galveston had the advantage since it was a deep
water port and Houston was not. To enable Houston to overcome its
inland location the Texas Commission gave Houston more favorable
rates on shipments to and from points in Texas approximately the same
distance from the two cities. The Court of Civil Appeals held this
beyond the power of the Commission, the Texas statute being similar to
the Interstate Commerce Act.62 Three years later the same question
arose and again the Court of Civil Appeals held the Commission was
not authorized to overcome the natural advantages of Galveston with
favorable rates to Houston, the purpose of the statute being to end
unreasonable discrimination of that sort by the railroads.6 3 This time
the Supreme Court of Texas reversed saying that access to the sea be-
longs to all people of the state so rates could be set to make it possible
for them to reach it.6 4 Then Houston was made accessible to deep-
water ships, and being further inland it had the geographical advantage.
Again the Commission sought to equalize the two ports, this time giving
Galveston a preferential rate. Once more the Court of Civil Appeals
said the Commission had no power under the statute to overcome eco-
nomic disadvantages with rate differentials, each locality being entitled
"
2R. R. Comm. v. Galveston Chamber of Commerce, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 476,
115 S. W. 94 (1908).
" Galveston Chamber of Commerce v. R. R. Comm., 137 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911).
"tR. R. Comm. v. Galveston Chamber of Commerce, 105 Tex. 101, 145 S. W.
573 (1912).
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to the natural advantages of its location.6 5 This time the Supreme Court
of Texas agreed.66
The Galveston-New Orleans case,6 7 the Lake Cargo Coal case and
these Galveston-Houston cases seem to lead to the conclusion that under
a statute like the Interstate Commerce Act while the regulatory com-
mission cannot, in the public interest, set rate differentials to overcome
disadvantages in location or production costs, the railroads, in the in-
terest of obtaining traffic, and so increasing their own revenues, may
do so within the zone of reasonableness, but not "with the motive of
injuring or aiding a shipper, a particular kind of traffic, or a locality."
That is, all differentials, by whomsoever established, must be based on
transportation conditions-a difference in cost of service, or carrier
competition.
DIFFERENTIALS BASED ON DIFFERENCE IN COST OF SERVICE
Under the statutes of all states and Section One of the Interstate
Commerce Act 6s rates must be reasonable per se. The same require-
ment was imposed by the common law.. A rate is no more than reason-
able per se if it pays the cost of service including a fair profit to the
carrier and no more. Because the services rendered by our modem
railroads, and other utilities, involve the joint use of property and em-
ployees by many patrons for varied purposes, it is impossible to calculate
the exact cost of serving a single patron or group. Consequently, we
try to fix the rate schedule as a whole so as to yield the carrier, or other
utility, from all of its business, a fair return on its entire investment,
and to distribute this burden among the many groups of patrons as
equitably as is practicable. The division is, at best, a rough estimate.
In the case of the railroad if traffic moves in a considerable volume under
a particular rate and pays something more than its out-of-pocket cost the
rate is very likely to be found reasonable per se as compared with rates
on other commodities. It is more difficult to sustain a difference be-
tween patrons shipping the same kind of article over the same railroad
between different places.
If a difference exists the complainant may possibly base his attack
under Section One on the theory that he is charged too much, in which
case the lower rate to another is mere evidence of the wrong done him,
or he may attack under Section Three, in which case the difference in
the rates is the wrong irrespective of the relation between the complain-
ant's rate and the cost of serving him. So, a comparison of rates enters
"Houston Chamber of Commerce v. R. R. Comm., 19 S. W. (2d) 583 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929).
" R. R. Comm. v. Houston Chamber of Commerce, 124 Tex. 375, 78 S. W.
(2d) 591 (1935).
Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1930).
"49 F. C. A. §1(5).
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into a discussion under either Section One or Section Three. Though
the nature of the injury, and so the damages recoverable, under these
sections is not the same, there seems to be no difference so far as the
evidential value of the comparative rates is concerned.
Since the starting point is the assumption that each patron will be
charged the total cost of serving him, and no more, obviously, a differ-
ence in cost of. service justifies a higher rate to the more expensive
patron. If other conditions are equal it costs more, in the aggregate,
to haul a longer distance than a shorter so in the absence of evidence
of a difference in other conditions it is not unreasonable to charge a
greater total rate between the more distant points.6 9
So far as the United States Constitution is concerned a state may
require a railroad to charge no more for a shorter than for a longer haul
over a different portion of its track or in a different direction so long as
the railroad does not show facts indicating material differences in trans-
portation conditions."° The not infrequent statutes of this type in the
early days of rate regulation71 were enacted on the theory that the rail-
road would not voluntarily establish a rate anywhere which would not
give it a fair return for its service, so a higher rate anywhere else neces-
sarily gave it more than a fair return. Of course, this is not sound for
the rate at the other points may have been set low because, due to com-
petition by other carriers, the traffic there would not move over this
railroad at all at a higher rate.7 2 A rate set on the theory that half a
loaf is better than no bread should not be taken as conclusive proof
that half a loaf is enough.
In the absence of such a statute it is generally agreed that a mere
showing of what rates are between other points is not conclusive.73
Nevertheless, proof that the same railroad, or other utility, charges lower
rates elsewhere is generally accepted as-evidence on the issue of reason-
ableness, and will probably control unless the services are rendered under
"Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. A. & W. P. R. R., 164 Ga. 822, 139 S. E. 725
(1927); Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 342 Ill. 11, 173 N. E. 804
(1930) ; St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. v. Hill, 14 Ill. App. 579 (1884) ; State ex rel.
Pugh v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 321 Mo. 297, 10 S. W. (2d) 946 (1928); Oregon-
Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Wks., 151 Wash. 142, 275 Pac. 87(1929).
7 Mo. Pac. Ry. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244 U. S. 191 (1917).
"'See: Chi. & A. R. R. v. People, 67 Ill. 11 (1873), holding such a statute
violated the state constitution; McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W.
1076 (1910); Chi., B. & Q. Ry. v. Anderson, 72 Neb. 856, 101 N. W. 1019 (1904);
and Hines v. Wilm. & W. R. R., 95 N. C. 434 (1886).
72 See: Lawrence, C. J., in Chi. & A. R. R. v. People, 67 Ill. 11 (1873).
" Cent. of Ga. Ry. v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 92 F. (2d) 292 (App. D. C.
1927) ; Darnell v. Edwards, 209 Fed. 99 (S. D. Miss. 1913) ; Chi. & E. I. Ry. v.
Ill. Commerce Comm., 343 Ill. 117, 175 N. E. 8 (1931); Mo., K. & T. Ry. v. Pub.
Util. Comm., 103 Kan. 111, 172 Pac. 1022 (1918); Shaw-Fahrer Grain Co. v.
Pub. Util. Comm., 126 Oh. St. 74, 183 N. E. 922 (1932) ; Hope Nat. Gas Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm., 112 W. Va. 223, 164 S. E. 248 (1932).
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conditions so obviously dissimilar as to require judicial notice of a
difference in cost, or the party seeking to preserve the differential proves
this or some other justification,7" though there is authority to the effect
that a comparison with other rates is presuasive only after a showing
that the other rates are themselves reasonable, 75 and, of course, though
the two distances be approximately equal, the carrier can justify a rate
differential by proof of grades and curves making one haul more expen-
sive than the other.7
A much more difficult problem is presented when the two services
are rendered entirely by different railroads, which is the situation in
many of the current controversies between extensive regions such as
the Southern, Official (Eastern), and Western rate classification terri-
tories. In such a case Section Three does not apply. In the New
Orleans-Galveston case77 the Supreme Court, first recognizing that Sec-
tion Three does apply where the defendant carrier is a party to two dis-
criminatory joint rates as well as where it is the only carrier involved
in the two rates complained of,78 held it did not apply where the de-
fendant carrier participated in but did not control one joint rate and the
other was its own rate from origin to destination. In the course of the
majority opinion Justice Roberts said:79
"... preference or prejudice can be found only by a comparison of two
rates. If these are the rate of one carrier to point A and that of another
to point B while a relationship of one to the other may be determined
neither the first nor the second carrier alone can be held to have created
the relation. Assuming that neither rate is unreasonable, the one carrier
cannot be compelled to alter its rate, because the other's is higher or
lower for the same service. A carrier or group of carriers must be the
common source of the discrimination-must effectively participate in
both rates if an order for correction of the disparity is to run against it
or them. Where an order is made under Section Three an alternative
"' See: Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Vest, 39 F. (2d) 658 (E. D. Ky. 1927) ; B. & 0.
R. R. v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1935); A. C. L. R. R. v. Tram-
mell, 287 Fed. 741 (N. D. Ga. 1923); City of New Haven v. New Haven Water
Co., 118 Conn. 389, 172 AUt. 767 (1934) ; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Ill. Commerce Comm.,
359 Ill. 563, 195 N. E. 32 (1935) ; Mo., K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 103 Kan.
111, 172 Pac. 1022 (1918); Hocking Valley Ry. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 92 Oh. St.
362, 110 N. E. 952 (1915) ; A., T., & S. F. Ry. v. State, 130 Okla. 263, 267 Pac. 253
(1928) ; Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm., 135 Pa. Sup. Ct. 218, 5 At.(2d) 410 (1939); Anchor Coal Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 123 W. Va. 439. 15
S. E. (2d) 406 (1942).
" Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 8 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Utah 1934); State ex rel. Puget Sound P. & Lt. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Wks., 181
Wash. 105, 42 P. (2d) 424 (1935).
"
8A., T., & S. F. Ry. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831
(1929) ; Chi. & E. I. Ry. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 343 Ill. 117, 175 N. E. 8 (1931);
N. Y. C. R. R. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 116 Oh. St. 120, 155 N. E. 862 (1927).
¢ Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1933).
8Citing: St. L.-S. W. Ry. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136 (1917). See also:
United States v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1924) ; Sou. Ry. v. United States,
204 Fed. 465 (Commerce Court, 1913).
"' Page 649 of the official report.
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must be afforded.8 0 The offender or offenders may abate the discrimina-
tion by raising one rate, lowering the other, or altering both.... The
situation must be such that the carrier or carriers if given an option
have an actual alternative."
Justice Stone dissented from the distinction between this case and the
one in which both rates were joint ones participated in by the defendant
railroad, but he did not take issue with the dictum that Section Three
has no application where the two rates are entirely separate rates of
different carriers. That this is true was made clear by the 1940 amend-
ment to Section Three adding:81
"Provided, however, that this paragraph shall not be construed to apply
to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other
carrier of whatever description."
It is difficult to see how a shipper would have any standing to attack
any rate given by another railroad to his competitor, regardless of how
injurious to him the 'relation between such rates and his own may be.
The only procedure open to him would seem to be to attack his own
rate an unreasonably high per se, using the other railroad's rate for
whatever it may be worth as a comparison. Having no data to show
cost of serving him, about all a shipper can do is to show that for
approximately the same distance another railroad charges a lower rate
on like goods, that the roads run through similar terrain, and are in the
same general class as to type and volume of business. This would seem
to be some indication at least that his rate is too much and to justify the
throwing on the defendant railroad the burden of justifying the differ-
ence by proof of greater expense or otherwise.8 2  It is so provided in
Nebraska by statute.m3 The Commission, on the other hand, may in-
quire on its own motion into the reasonableness per se, as well as rela-
tively of any rate.84
It was held quite early that the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of a particular carrier's rate was not conclusively established by proof
of what another carrier charged for a similar service 85 The reason for
80 Here the court inserted the following footnote: "This is not true of an order
pursuant to Section 15(1), prescribing maximum or minimum or maximum and
minimum rates; but the present orders were not issued under that section."8149 F. C. A. §3(1), as amended by Act of Sept. 18, 1940, 54 STAT. 902.
S2See: Minneapolis Traffic Asso. v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 245 I. C. C. 11 (1941),
saying evidence of widespread absorption of switching charges is "strong evidence"
that a refusal to do so at Minneapolis is unreasonable; Ry. Exp. Agency v. United
States, 6 F. Supp. 249 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
"' Lincoln Commercial Club v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 103 Neb. 504, 172 N. W. 687(1919).8 INTERSTATE CommEcc ACT §15(1), 49 F. C. A. §15(1).
8I. C. C. v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541 (1912). For similar decisions
under state statutes see: Darnell v. Edwards, 209 Fed. 99 (S. D. Miss. 1913);
Morgan's L. & T. R. R. & SS. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 127 La. 636, 53 So. 890(1911); Shaw-Fahrer Grain Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 126 Oh. St. 74, 183 N. E.
922 (1932).
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this is that the lower limit of reasonableness of a rate per se is deter-
mined by what the service costs the carrier, including not only the out-
of-pocket cost attributable solely to that service but also a portion of
the joint costs such as maintenance of the right of way, salaries of
officials, and return to investors. Operating costs are not the same on
different railroads due to topography and other reasons. The amounts
needed to give the two groups of investors fair returns are not the
same. Finally, the roads' volumes of business are not the same, which
means that one road can divide its joint costs among more people than
the other can.
There is no formula which will result in an accurate division of joint
costs among patrons of a railroad or other utility. Within limits a
regulatory commission can shift som of the joint-cost burden from
shippers of one commodity to those of another so as to enable the former
to compete with their rivals on another railroad, but in the absence of
clear proof of a compelling public need for doing so it cannot cut a
rate below the point at which the carrier makes a substantial return for
its service in hauling that commodity; that is, each type of traffic must
make a substantial contribution to the joint costs.86 It would seem
from the Lake Cargo Coal case8 7 that a public interest in enabling ship-
pers of a given commodity to compete with their rivals on another road
is not such a public need as will justify the commission's shifting the
burden of joint costs from them to shippers of another commodity. In
addition to .the legal barriers there are practical limits to the power of
shifting joint costs, for the second group of shippers is likely to have
competitors on the other railroad too.
Of course, if the traffic is not moving, or is barely trickling, under
the existing rate because the producers of the commodity cannot com-
pete for the market at destination, the present rate does not result in
those producers carrying any part of the joint cost of the railroad. A
lower rate may increase the volume of the shipments of that article
enough so that the railroad's net revenue from it-the difference be-
tween gross revenue and out-of-pocket cost-will increase. If that is
the case the lower rate will hurt neither the railroad nor its patrons ship-
ping other commodities, but on the contrary is a more reasonable rate
since it enables the shippers of this article to carry some of the joint
cost. If the lower rate will not produce this result, if the railroad is
not now making more than a fair return, and if the present rate does not
throw an excessive share of the joint costs upon this commodity, the
present rate is not unreasonably high per se, and cannot be reduced over
the railroad's objection. In such a case, as one court has said of rates
No. Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585 (1915).81Anchor Coal v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928).
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for electricity, if the complainant feels his service is costing him more
than it is worth the only thing he can do is find a substitute.88
DIFFERENTIALS BASED ON CARRIER COMPETITION
In Texas and Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission"0
the question of carrier competition as an excuse for rate differentials
was first presented to the Supreme Court. The Commission ordered the
railroad to accept as its share of a joint rate from a foreign port to a
point in the United States no less than it charged on a domestic ship-
ment from the port of reception to the point of destination. The railroad
continued its arrangement with ocean carriers whereby on through ship-
ments from England to San Francisco by way of New Orleans it re-
ceived as its share of the joint rate less than its own rate from New
Orleans to San Francisco on shipments originating at New York, Phila-
delphia and other eastern seaboard points. Its share of the rate from
England paid more than the out-of-pocket cost, and it defended the
differential by showing that if it insisted upon a greater rate from
England, or a large share of the present rate, it would lose all of the
traffic since, in that event, all the goods would go from England to San
Francisco around Cape Horn or across the Isthmus of Panama and then
again by water to the destination, rates for which transportation were,
of course, beyond the power of the Commission. Apparently it was not
feasible to ship by Cape Horn or the Isthmus from New York and the
other eastern seaboard ports. The Commission refused to consider this
fact on the theory that the Act limited it to a consideration of circum-
stances pertaining to the traffic after it reached the United States.00
Its view was accepted by the district court, which said a carrier could
justify a differential only by showing it cost less to render one service
than the other.9 ' The circuit court of appeals said that even if compe-
tion from other carriers justified some differential the railroad had made
too great a difference and so the order of the Commission was enforce-
able.9 2 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that carrier competition
is a fact to be considered in determining whether a differential is an
unreasonable discrimination in violation of Section Three, and, since the
Commission had not taken it into consideration at all, the case was not
before the circuit court of appeals in such a way as to enable it to de-
termine what the amount of the differential should be, so it should have
sent the case back to the Commission for a fixing of the rate in the
light of competition and other facts. Justice Shiras, for the majority,
said :o9
89Ga. P. & Lt. Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm., 8 F. Supp. 603 (N. D. Ga. 1934).
,'162 U. S. 197 (1896). 90 4 1. C. C. 447.L'1. C. C. v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 52 Fed. 187 (S. D. N. Y. 1892).
"I. C. C. v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 57 Fed. 948 (C. C. A. 2d, 1893).
" Page 220 of the official report.
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".... we think it evident that those facts and matters which carriers, apart
from any given question arising under the statute, would treat as calling,
in given cases, for a preference or advantage, are facts and matters which
must be considered by the Commission in forming its judgment whether
such preference or advantage is undue or unreasonable."
A similar conclusion was reached by the English courts construing
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854,94 from which Sections Two
and Three of the Interstate Commerce Act were taken, Lord Herschell
saying:
"It is said that it is unfair to the trader who is nearer the market that
he should not enjoy the full benefit of the advantage to be derived from
his geographical situation at a point on the railway nearer the market than
his fellow trader who trades at a point more distant; but I cannot see,
looking at the matter as between the two traders, why the advantageous
position of the one trader in having his works so placed that he has two
competitive routes is not as much a circumstance to be taken into con-
sideration as the geographical position of the other trader, who, though
he has not the advantage of competition, is situated at a point on the line
geographically nearer the market."
In East Tennessee etc. Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sioni railroad competition was recognized as making the circumstances
dissimilar. The Commission ordered the railroad to refrain from charg-
ing a higher rate to Chattanooga than to Nashville, the latter being a
longer haul over the same line. The railroad justified the differential by
showing that at Nashville there was competition with. other railroads so
that if it did not charge the low rate to Nashville it would get no Nash-
ville traffic, and that the existing rate to Nashville paid more than the
out-of-pocket cost. On behalf of the Commission it was contended that
this violated both the Long and Short Haul Clause of the Section Four 6
and the unreasonable discrimination provision of Section Three. The
Supreme Court rejected both contentions. Of that dealing with Section
Three it said .97
"The prohibition of the third section, when that section-is considered in
its proper relation, is directed against unjust discrimination or undue
preference arising from the voluntary and wrongful act of the carriers
complained of as having given undue preference, and does not relate to
acts the result of conditions wholly beyond the control of such carriers.
The Commission found that if the defendant carriers had not adjusted
their rates to meet the competitive condition at Nashville, the only con-
sequence would have been to deflect the traffic at the reduced rates over
other lines."
The court then recognized that the- right of the carrier to cut rates to
meet competition was not unlimited, using as an illustration the case of
"' Phipps v. London & N. W. Ry., 2 Q. B. D. (1892) 229.
95181 U. S. 1 (1901). '"49 F. C. A. §4.
"' Pages 18 and 19 of the official report.
19471
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a carrier cutting its rate to the competitive point below cost, by which
the court apparently meant out-of-pocket cost. Of such a situation it
said :08
"Clearly, in such a case, the engaging in such competitive traffic would
both bring about an unjust discrimination and a disregard of the public
interest, since a tendency toward unreasonable rates on other business
would arise from the carriage of traffic at less than the cost of trans-
portation to particular places."
An analysis of these two cases shows that carrier competition at
city A and no competition at city B was held to be a fact to be con-
sidered by the Commission in determining the reasonableness of a pref-
erence to A because: (1) If the preference were removed the defendant
railroad would lose all the traffic going to A; (2) the shippers to and
from B were in no worse position with respect to their own ability to
compete with their rivals in A than they would be if the preferential
rate were raised; and (3) the rate to A paid more than the out-of-pocket
cost so that it did not cause rates to B and other places to be raised to
make up a deficit in carrier revenue. That is, a preference is not un-
reasonable when it is designed to increase the carrier's revenues from
transportation and does not injure other patrons.
In United States v. Illinois Central Railroad" the railroad established
a blanket or group rate on lumber moving to the North from all points
in the area from the Mississippi River to Alabama and from Jackson
to the Gulf, which points were on its own main or branch lines or on
the lines of independent roads if such roads had competitive connections
with another trunk line, but not to points within the area on independent
lines not so connected with competitors of the Illinois Central. Knoxo,
Mississippi, was on the line of an independent road which connected
with the Illinois Central but not with any competing road. As a result
the lumber plant at Knoxo paid 2 cents per 100 pounds more than mills
at points to which the blanket rate was given although Knoxo was in the
center of the blanket area. The Commission found the Knoxo rate was
not unreasonably high per se, and did not find the blanket rate unreason-
ably low per se, but found the differential unreasonable discrimination
under Section Three and ordered it discontinued. The court sustained
the order, Justice Brandeis saying :100
"The effort of a carrier to obtain more business, and to retain that which
it had secured, proceeds from the motive of self interest which is recog-
nized as legitimate; and the fact that preferential rates were given only
for this purpose relieves the carrier from any charge of favoritism or
Page 20 of the official report.90263 U. S. 515 (1924).




malice. But preferences may inflict undue prejudice though the carrier's
motives in granting them are honest. Self interest of the carrier may
not override the requirement of equality in rates. It is true that the law
does not attempt to equalize opportunities among localities and that the
advantage which comes to a shipper merely as a result of the position of
his plant does not constitute an illegal preference. To bring a difference
in rates within the prohibition of Section Three, it must be shown that
the discrimination practiced is unjust when measured by the transporta-
tion standard. In other words, the difference in rates cannot be held
illegal, unless it is shown that it is not justified by the cost of the re-
spective services, by their values, or by other transportation conditions.
But the mere fact that the Knoxo rate is inherently reasonable, and
that the rate from competing points is not shown to be unreasonably low,
does not establish that the discrimination is just. Both rates may lie
within the zone of reasonableness and yet result in undue prejudice."
After observing that the Commission had considered all the facts pre-
sented by the railroad and that the weight to be given these was for the
Commission, he continued :10
"The innocent character of the discrimination practiced by the Illinois
Central was not established, as a matter of law, by showing that the
preferential rate was given to others for the purpose of developing traffic
on the carrier's own lines or of securing competitive traffic. These were
factors to be considered by the Commission; but they did not preclude
a finding that the discrimination practiced is unjust. Such was the law
even before the Transportation Act of 1920. In view of the policy and
provisions of that statute, the Commission may properly have concluded
that the carrier's design to originate traffic on its own lines, or to take
traffic from a competitor, should not be given as much weight in deter-
mining the justness of a discrimination against a locality as theretofore.
For now, the interests of the individual carrier must yield in many re-
spects to the public need, and the newly conferred power to grant relief
against rates unreasonably low may afford protection against injurious
rate-policies of a competitor, which were theretofore uncontrollable."
At first glance it seems that this departs from the Texas and Pacific
and East Tennessee cases since to charge points on competitive inde-
pendent lines the Knoxo rate would cause traffic from those places to
be lost to the Illinois Central, discontinuing the preference would not
help the plant at Knoxo to compete with those on the competitive inde-
pendent lines, and the blanket rate was remunerative so that it did not
make the Knoxo rate unreasonably high. However, the blanket rate
was also given to non-competitive points on the Illinois Central's own
line which points were considerably farther from the market than was
Knoxo. It was the discrimination between Knoxo and these other non-
101 Page 525 of the official report. Authorities cited by the court have been
omitted.
19471
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
competitive points which was unreasonable,10 2 so the Illinois Central
case does not change the rule of the older decisions.
In view of the 1940 amendment to Section Three 0 3 it appears that
the possibly conflicting policy of the Transportation Act of 1920 has
been abandoned in favor of carrier competition. In the comparatively
recent case of L. T. Barringer and Company v. United States0 4 the
Court refused to set aside an order of the Commission approving a charge
by a railroad for loading cotton at Oklahoma points for shipment into
the Southeast and loading without charge at the same places for ship-
ment to Gulf ports. The reason given by the carriers was that this was
necessary to meet truck competition from Oklahoma to the Gulf ports,
there being no trucking of cotton to the southeastern destinations. Four
justices dissented on the ground that this was an accessorial service,
not a part of the line haul, and so was governed by Section Two which
requires absolute equality. Chief Justice Stone, for the majority, said :105
"It has long been established by our decisions that differences in com-
petitive conditions may justify a relatively lower line-haul charge over
one line than another, and that it is for the Commission, not the courts,
to say whether those differences are sufficient to show that a difference
in rates established to meet those conditions is not an unjust discrim-
ination or otherwise unlawful. It follows that competitive conditions,
which would justify and render non-discriminatory a reduction in the
line-haul tariff on a particular class of traffic, would likewise justify the
reduction and render it non-discriminatory if made in the loading charge
instead. Whether made in the one charge or in the other, it enters into
the total cost of the line-haul to the shipper, regardless of whether the
loading charge be separately stated or included in the line haul tariff.
Since the only effect on the shipper is the difference in the line-haul
charge he is harmed no more by one method of effecting that difference
than the other, any conditions attending the line haul which justify the
one as non-discriminatory equally justify the other."
This emphasis on the carrier's need to give the preference to protect
itself against competition and the absence of injury to the complaining
shipper is clearly in line with the reasoning in the Texas and Pacific and
East Tennessee cases. The dictum in the New Orleans-Galveston case'00
to the effect that Section Three allows the carrier to set rates to retain
102 Since the Illinois Central controlled the joint rate from Knoxo this case is
not governed by Justice Roberts' rule in Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289
U. S. 627 (1933) to the effect that Section Three does not apply where the differ-
ential is between a rate controlled by the defendant and one participated in but
not controlled by it.
103 This reads: "Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be construed
to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other
carrier of whatsoever description." 54 STAT. 902, 49 F. C. A. §3(1).104319 U. S. 1 (1943).




'Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627, 636 (1933).
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traffic but not for the purpose of building up one community or destroy-
ing another is also in accord with the original rule since it requires that
the preference be given for the purpose of getting traffic which would
otherwise be lost to a competitor. A number of state decisions and
early decisions in the lower federal courts are likewise in agreement.'
0 7
Apparently, a difference in the cost of rendering two services gives
the railroad a clear right to make a corresponding difference in rates
regardless of its motive or the effect upon the patron paying the higher
one, whereas carrier competition at the preferred locality is merely a
fact to be considered by the Commission when the carrier shows the
three conditions of the rule of the Texas and Pacific and East Tennessee
cases have been met. The Commission's decision will not be disturbed
on this ground unless it shows that the Commission ignored competition
or unless there is no substantial evidence to support the finding.
THE LONG AND SHORT HAUL CLAUSE
Not infrequently the rate on a shipment passing through a locality
and going on to a more distant place is less than it would have been
had the shipment been consigned to the first town. This special form
of discrimination between patrons on account of locality is dealt with in
Section Four of the Interstate Commerce Act. 08 It provides in sub-
stance that without first obtaining the approval of the Commission no
carrier shall receive a greater aggregate compensation for transporting
passengers or a like kind of property for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being in-
cluded in the longer distance. After investigation the Commission may
authorize a less rate for the longer distance but such a rate must be at
least reasonably compensatory. No such authority may be granted on
account of merely potential water carrier competition and when a rail-
road has reduced rates to competitive points because of actual water
carrier competition it may not raise such rates again until the Com-
mission, after hearing, finds a change in conditions other than the
elimination of water competition. Commission approval of a lower
long haul rate is not, however, a grant in perpetuity and the Commission
can reopen the question wthout waiting for a petition from the carrier,
as where it finds the low long haul rate is eliminating water carriers
from competition. 0 9
0' I. C. C. v. Nash. C. & St. L. Ry., 120 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903) ; I. C. C.
v. Cinti. P. & V. R. R., 124 Fed. 624 (E. D. N. C. 1903) ; N. Y. Central R. R. v.
P. U. Comm. of Ohio, 116 Oh. St. 120, 155 N. E. 862 (1927); R. R. Comm. v.
Hocking Valley Ry., 82 Oh. St. 25, 91 N. E. 865 (1910); Chi. & A. R. R. v.
People, 67 Ill. 11 (1875) ; Wedron Silica Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 387 Ill. 581,
57 N. E. (2d) 349 (1944). But see Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nav. Co. v.
Dept. Pub. Wks., 151 Wash. 142, 275 Pac. 87 (1929).
08 49 F. C. A. §4.
... Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557 (1919).
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As originally enacted, this prohibition against a less rate for the long
haul did not apply unless the shipments were "under substantially sim-
ilar circumstances and conditions." The Supreme Court held that in
Section Two these words were confined to circumstances and conditions
relating to transportation so carrier competition did not justify a dif-
ference in rates for like and contemporaneous services in transporting a
like kind of traffic.110 The court said the purpose of Section Four was
different from that of Section Two and the words had a broader meaning
in the Long and Short Haul Clause, so carrier competition between the
long haul points and no competition for the short haul was a dissimilar-
ity in circumstances which the Commission must consider though it did
not necessarily relieve the carrier from the prohibition.11' In the same
case the court also held that where there was such dissimilarity in the
conditions the railroad could charge less for the longer haul without
first obtaining the approval of the Commission.
The Act was amended in 1910112 and the phrase "under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions" was eliminated. In the Inter-
mountain Rate case 113 the railroads had applied to the Commission for
permission to continue their coast-to-coast rates lower in the aggregate
than the rate from a coastal point to an intermediate, inland point, the
only reason for the proposed lower long haul rate being competition from
water carriers and from Canadian coast-to-coast railroads. The Com-
mission, after a hearing, granted relief but on condition that a propor-
tion be maintained between the two rates, which proportion was to vary
with the zones into which it divided the country. The railroads disre-
garded the order and sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute as
amended, contending it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The Commerce Court granted the injunction saying the order
exceeded the Commission's authority, since it did not set the rate but
merely a proportion to be maintained between rates. 14  The Supreme
Court reversed, saying the Commission had not exceeded its authority
1 Wight v. United States, 167 U. S. 512 (1897).
I. C. C. v. Ala. Midland Ry., 168 U. S. 144 (1897) ; Lou. & Nash. R. R. v.
Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648 (1900); East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. v. I. C. C., 181 U. S. 1
(1901) ; I. C. C. v. Clyde SS. Co., 181 U. S. 29 (1901) ; I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R.,
190 U. S. 273 (1903). Most of the lower federal courts had reached the same
conclusion prior to the Alabama Midland case. See: Ex parte Koehler, 31 Fed.
315 (D. Ore. 1887); Mo. Pac. Ry. v. S. T. & P. Ry., 31 Fed. 862 (E. D. La.
1887) ; I. C. C. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 50 Fed. 295 (S. D. Cal. 1892) ; I. C. C. v.
Cin. N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 56 Fed. 925 (N. D. Ga. 1893). But see: Junod v. Chi. &
N. W. Ry., 47 Fed. 290 (S. D. Iowa 1891). At least two state courts had reached
the opposite result in interpreting similar state legislation. Ill. Cent. R. R. v.
People, 121 Ill. 304, 12 N. E. 670 (1887); L. & N. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 104
Ky. 226, 46 S. W. 707 (1898).
..1 36 STAT. 547.
... United States v. A., T., & S. F. R. R., 234 U. S. 476 (1914).




and the amendment did not change the previous law in substance, but
merely required prior approval by the Commission of the long haul rate
even though there was competition at the long haul points. So, compe-
tition for the long haul is still a circumstance to be considered by the
Commission, which the court said must exercise its discretion in the
light of Section Two and Three, for which reason the amended statute
was held not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Since it necessarily costs more to haul a shipment through Town A
to the more distant Town B than to stop it in Town A, and since a
railroad cannot set rates for the sole purpose of building up one town
and destroying another,115 and, according to the Lake Cargo Coal
case,116 even the Commission cannot set rates for the purpose of equal-
izing competitive abilities of shippers in different cities, it seems that
the only possible justification for a lower rate for the longer haul is
carrier competition. The test, then, as in other cases of carrier com-
petition, would seem to be: (1) Will the railroad lose the traffic if
it raises the long haul rate? (2) If the lower long haul rate be raised
will the shipper in the intermediate town be in a better position to
compete with his rival at the long haul destination? (3) Will the lower
long haul rate cause a financial loss to the railroad which must be
passed on to its other patrons in rates higher than they would pay if
the long haul rate were raised?
In the BehInmer casell 7 shipments of grain and hay from Memphis to
Charleston passed through Summerville. The Summerville rate was
not unreasonable per se but was calculated by adding to the Charleston
rate the local rate back from Charleston to Summerville. Thus, though
the Summerville consignment actually never went to Charleston, the rate
was calculated on the basis of its having gone there and returned to
Summerville. The justification was that the Charleston rate was fixed
to meet water and rail-water carrier competition from Chicago to
Charleston; that is, rates fixed by these carriers on hay and grain pro-
duced in the Chicago area. The Commission ordered the railroad to
cease the discrimination, on the theory that the carrier competition did
not originate at the point of origin of these shipments, and in any event,
since the other carriers were subject to the Act, competition from them
could not be considered. The Supreme Court held this was error," 8
competition for the long haul being an element to be considered regard-
less of the fact that the competing carrier was subject to the Act and
despite the fact that the one carrier hauls western grain and hay from
... Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627, 636-7 (1930).
118 Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928).
""Lou. & Nash. R. R. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648 (1900).
" E. Tenn., V. & G. Ry. v. I. C. C., 181 U. S. 1 (1901), also held that it is
immaterial whether the competition is by water or rail carriers.
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Chicago while the other hauls southern grain and hay from Memphis.
Assuming that an increase in the Memphis-Charleston rate would have
caused Charleston merchants to buy their grain and hay in Chicago, and
assuming that the long haul rate yielded something above out-of-pocket
cost, the above test was met, for should the Memphis grain and hay be
so shut out of the Charleston market the Charleston merchants would
still have received their goods at the same preference over Summerville
merchants, regardless of whether the latter bought in Chicago or Mem-
phis. The inability of Summerville merchants to compete was not caused
by the defendant railroad but by the natural advantage of Charleston's
location, and the defendant could not be forced to reduce its revenue to
overcome such an advantage possessed by Charleston.1 9 On the con-
trary, if it did so, it would probably be an unjust discrimination against
that city.120 Whether these assumptions as to the necessity of the pres-
ent rate to meet competition and the amount of revenue it yields are
sound are, of course, questions of fact to be determined by the Com-
mission. On these questions the courts can conduct no original inquiry
and are bound by the Commission's order unless an error of law has
been committed or there is no substantial evidence to support the Com-
mission's findings.121
EXTENT, CAUSES AND CONTROL OF DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PATRONS
IN THE EAST, SOUTH AND WEST
The United States is divided for railroad rate purposes into three
classification areas, in which there are some subdivisions. Roughly,
Official Territory lies east of the Mississippi River and north of the
Ohio and the Potomac; Southern Territory lies east of the Mississippi
and south of Official Territory; Western Territory includes the area
west of the Mississippi. This division apparently was made so as to
reduce to the minimum the number of railroads running from one terri-
tory into the other.1 22 Rates, within and between these territories, are
of three types: class, commodity and exception. Class rates apply to
high grade manufactured goods of considerable value in proportion to
weight. Approximately 4 per cent of all carload freight and a large
part of less than carload shipments move under these. Commodity rates
apply on most raw materials and heavy manufactured goods, and account
for about 85 per cent of all carload traffic. Exception rates are ex-
ceptions to class rates which would otherwise apply, as where an article
119 Ex parte Koehler, 25 Fed. 73 (D. Ore. 1885) ; I. C. C. v. A., T., & S. F. Ry.,
50 Fed. 295 (1892).
... Brewer v. Cent. of Ga. Ry., 84 Fed. 258 (S. D. Ga. 1898).
.
2
.E. Tenn. V. & G. Ry. v. 1. C. C., 181 U. S. 1 (1901); L C. C. v. Clyde SS.
Co., 181 U. S. 29 (1901); United States v. A., T., & S. F. R. R., 234 U. S. 476
(1914); United States v. L. & N. R. R., 235 U. S. 314 (1914).
.See WENDELL BERGE, ECONOMIC FREEDOM FOR THE WEST (1946) 104.
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is taken out of its regular class and put in another. They are usually
lower than the class rate which would otherwise apply and are set by
the carriers to meet truck competition, to establish a rate of restricted
application, and for administrative convenience. These account for about
10 per cent of carload shipments.1 23
"The importance of class rates lies in the fact that they apply par-
ticularly to manufactured goods so that the effect of a differential must
inevitably be reflected in the distribution of manufacturing industries." 12 4
Each kind of article moving under class rates is given a class rating,
of which Official Territory has 27, Southern 28 and Western 26.125 It
may be rated differently in each of the three territories. Of a total of
more than 20,000 articles rated, at the time of the Commission's inves-
tigation, only 12,000 were uniform in all three, most of the differences
being in favor of Official Territory.126  In each territory rates are set
for each class, and these were likewise found to differ between the terri-
tories with a tremendous preponderance of the differences being in favor
of Official Territory, both on less than carload and on carload ship-
ments. 12 7  Like differences were found in shipments from one territory
into the other. According to the Interstate Commerce Commission' 28
some "typical rates" on Class One goods were: New York to Chicago
(890 miles) $1.67 per hundredweight; Atlanta to Chicago (728 miles)
$2.10; Pittsburgh to Kansas City (852 miles) $1.97; Atlanta to Kansas
City (879 miles) $2.40; Detroit to Dallas (1,116 miles) $2.89; Atlanta
to Dallas (822 miles) $2.61; Atlanta to New Orleans (429 miles) $1.73.
According to Honorable Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General of
the United States,'12 9 "On the average, goods subject to class rates,
which are primarily important in the marketing of industrial products,
"'The following table appearing in Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I. C. C.
447, 564 (1946), shows the division of carload traffic among these three types of
rates in Southern and Official Territories:
Territory Class Exception Commodity
Rates Rates Rates
Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent
Within Official ............... 5.8 17.6 76.7
Within Southern ............. 1.8 6.0 92.2
Official to Southern ...... ...... 12.6 36.3 51.1
Southern to Official ........... 0.9 4.9 94.2
See Heath, The Uniform Class Rate Decision and Its Implications for Southern
Economic Development (1946) 22 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 213.
124 BERGE, op. cit. supra note 122, at 107.
125 Class Rate Investigation, 262 I. C. C. 447, 467 (1945).
1"' Id. at 468 and 471.
12' For example: Of 2,092 articles put in Class One in Official Territory, on all
but 12 the rate was higher by approximately 30 per cent in Southern. Of 2,672
given the next rating in Official Territory, all but 51 paid over 40 per cent higher
rates in Southern, and so on through all the classes. The difference was even
greater as between Official and Western Territories. Id. at 731.
128 Id. at 567.
229 BERGE, op. cit. supra note 122, at 107.
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must pay rates 37 per cent higher in the South than for comparable
service in the East. In the West these rates are from 46 per cent to
71 per cent higher than in the East."
Turning to commodity rates the Commission said :130
"In many instances, commodity rates in the South are lower than com-
modity rates on like traffic in Official Territory. There is no compre-
hensive showing as to the general level of commodity rates in the South
as compared with that in Official Territory. The record does reveal,
however, that in the following instances commodity rates in the South
are lower than rates on the same commodity in Official Territory: Brick,
building and facing ... fertilizer and fertilizer materials .. . lime ...
logs ... lumber ... pig iron ... pulpwood ... sand, gravel, crushed
stone and slag ... iron or steel scrap ... sulphuric acid . . iron ore."
Thus the combination of class rates and commodity rates seems to en-
courage the movement of raw materials and semi-finished goods to Offi-
cial Territory and to give finished manufactured articles made in Official
Territory an advantage over those made elsewhere.
It is a matter of common knowledge that most of the manufacturing
plants of the country, most of its population, most of its purchasing
power, and its highest average individual income are to be found in
Official Territory. Though it covers but 14 per cent of the land area of
the country, the Commission found that" -
"Depending on whether Michigan and Virginia are excluded or included,
Official Territory is estimated to contain between 60 and 62 per cent of
the manufacturing establishments, between 44 and 46 per cent of the
hotel rooms, 59 and 61 per cent of the office, trade and other business
structures, 50 and 52 per cent of the dwelling units, 48 and 50 per cent
of the motor vehicles, 56 and 58 per cent of the miles of wire in cable,
and 64 and 66 per cent of the miles of all wire of telephone companies."
In 1940 the population of Official Territory was approximately 49 per
cent of the whole, and from 1900 to 1940 it had 48 per cent of the total
increase in the nation's population but 53 per cent of the increase in
gainfully employed persons. Although so highly industrialized it is an
important agricultural area, its farm products in 1940 amounting to
approximately 31 per cent in value of the total for the country.1 3 2
So many factors are involved in the development of such an economic
condition that it is probably impossible to say with any degree of accuracy
what part preferential freight rates have played, but it is obvious that
a freight rate structure such as the Commission found to exist tends to
develop just such a concentration of industry and wealth. As to this the
Commission said :133
"' Class Rate Investigation, 262 I. C. C. 447, 593-600 (1945).




"The principal factors which control the location of industries are:
Availability of and cost of obtaining and assembling raw materials;
availability of markets, including cost of reaching such markets, ad-
equacy and cost of fuel and power, climate, labor, capital, and, some-
times, momentum of an early start, and the personality of the individual
founding the industry. In 1939, freight revenue on commodities in the
manufactures and miscellaneous group was but 5.3 per cent of the des-
tination value of manufactured goods. From this it would seem that
any differences in freight charges resulting from differences in class rate
levels is only a small fraction of that figure. Nearness to markets and
ability to ship to markets, on a basis fairly and reasonably related to the
rates of competitors, are nevertheless potent factors in the location of a
manufacturing plant. In fact, rate relations are more important to the
manufacturer and shipper than the levels of the rates."
Accepting the Commission's figure that for the entire country freight
rates account for only 5.3 per cent of the destination value of class-rate
goods, practically all of the class rate shipments being in or from Official
Territory, and Southern class rates being on the average 39 per cent
higher than Official, it would seem that freight on Southern class-rate
articles would amount to approximately 7.5 per cent of the destination
value, and the ratio is still greater as to Western Territory goods. On
many articles the manufacturer's margin of profit is little if anything
more than two or three per cent of the gross value of the article at
destination. In any event the difference gives the manufacturers in
Official Territory a power to undersell the Southern and Western manu-
facturers substantially and regularly, so perhaps Mr. Berge does not
exaggerate in saying :134
"The WVest and South have long fought against these high and discrim-
inatory freight rates. Until very recently the battle has been waged
without victory or effect. To both regions continuous disadvantage in
transport cost has meant not only the loss of local industry and the
inability of new industry to rise. It has meant a perpetual reduction in
purchasing power, a gradual drift of population to more favored regions,
and, in some sections, it has meant even the closing of schools and the
loss of homes and farms. Bitter experience has taught the people of
these regions a basic lesson-that it will avail them little to build fac-
tories, to develop power projects, to seek new industries and new capital
unless the slow poison of transport handicaps can be eliminated."
Similarly, a rather minute difference in commodity rates may divert
shipments from one market to another. Perhaps wheat affords the most
striking example. For many years and through a series of hearings the
Commission has struggled to establish and maintain a fair rate structure
for wheat all over the country. It has likened freight rates on wheat
to a blanket in that the slightest pull at one part of the country has an
... BERGE, op. cit. supra note 122, at 109.
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effect throughout the whole.135 . Failure to absorb switching charges at
Minneapolis while absorbing them at Chicago was found to divert sub-
stantial shipments to the latter, though the net saving to the shipper was
only a little more than one-eighth cent per bushel. 18 6
The injurious' consequences probably flowing from long continued,
systematic freight rate discrimination between patrons in different local-
ities are far reaching. The shipper paying the higher rate is at a dis-
advantage in competing for the market with his favored rival, and in
normal times most markets and most commodities are highly competi-
tive. Through this injury to him his community loses his purchasing
power and, more important, his wage-paying power. It is impossible
to calculate this indirect injury accurately and it may easily be exag-
gerated. It would seem that the purchasers in the market from which
he is excluded have been hurt in that they have lost the opportunity to
choose between competing sellers, though the Supreme Court has held
that there is no undue prejudice against the market city in discrimina-
tory rates to producers for the market. 137 When the discrimination
results from a relation of rates of two separate carriers the carrier
charging the higher rate may lose so much traffic as to impair its own
efficiency. An indirect consequence is, as we have seen, the concentra-
tion of industry, a matter of considerable concern in the problem of
national defense in these modern times. However, all of these other
injuries are indirect results of the injury to the patron who pays the
higher rate and do not exist unless there is an injury to him, so it is
perhaps best to consider only the injury to him in determining the pro-
priety of rate discriminations on account of locality.
It is perhaps as difficult to ascertain the cause of the systematic dis-
crimination in favor of shippers in and from Official Territory as it is
to trace its effect, but here, as there, some general trends appear. We
have seen that the two justifications for preferences of this type are a
difference in cost of service and carrier competition making it necessary
in order to save the traffic for the carrier. Because of the volume of
traffic it might be thought that per unit of service it costs the roads in
Official Territory less to carry freight, but the Commission has found
just the reverse to be true, saying :138
"The various comparisons of territorial costs reviewed hereinabove show
that there is little significant difference in the cost of furnishing trans-
portation in the South as compared to the East, excluding the Poca-
hontas territory. The figures both for the year 1939 and the period
''Rate Structure Investigation, 164 I. C. C. 619, 697 (1930).
"'6 Minneapolis Traffic Asso. v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 245 1. C. C. 11 (1941).
.. Phila. & Rdg. R. R. v. United States, 240 U. S. 334 (1916).
1.8 Class Rate Investigation, 262 I. C. C. 447, 591 (1945). The studies referred




1930-1939 indicate that, taken as a whole, the costs in the South are
equal to or a little lower than those in the East. If the period 1937-41
is used the costs in the South are substantially lower than those in the
East."
That being so we should expect to find that the difference in rates is
caused by carrier competition, but it appears that just the reverse is
true here also, and that the differences in rates are due to absence of
carrier competition. At least that is the conclusion of the United States
Department of Justice and of the state government of Georgia, which
has pending in the United States Supreme Court an original suit brought
against numerous railroads alleged to have conspired to eliminate carrier
competition in rates.' 39 The United States has brought suit in the dis-
trict court in Nebraska, alleging a similar collusion to maintain non-
competitive rates in the West.140
In its trial brief Georgia contends that the following is the true
situation :141
For a long time prior to 1934 the railroads maintained a large number
of regional associations, the basic function of which was to maintain
technical rate experts to assist the railroads with various mechanical
aspects of rate modification. In 1934 all of these were merged into a
single integrated hierarchy of trade associations culminating in the Asso-
ciation of American Railroads, newly formed, principally at the instiga-
tion of certain large and influential institutional and private investors.
The object of this combination was to establish private dominion and
control over all freight rates by preventing individual carriers from
initiating competitive freight rates in accordance with the provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act. This object was achieved by compelling
individual carriers as a condition of filing rate proposals with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to obtain first the approval of the proposed
rates by the rate fixing agencies of the association. Members agreed to
abide by the decision of the association's board of directors and failure
to do so would necessitate withdrawal from the association. The con-
sequence of withdrawal would be a practical boycott of the offender by
the remaining members; that is, it would be excluded from agreements
relating to car service, per diem rules, agreements relating to repairs
and like cooperative agreements, and joint traffic would be diverted to
other roads whenever possible. In other words the association prevents
competition by "the fear of the united competition of the association
against the particular member." Another pressure can be exerted on
rebellious members through the banking connections of the other mem-
bers of the association. Gradually the financial groups came to regard
... The right of the state to sue was established in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R. R., et als., 324 U. S. 439 (1945).
"" United States v. Asso. of American Railroads, Civil Docket No. 246, U. S.
Dist. Ct., Nebraska District.
"'4 The brief seems to be well supported by exhibits from which it quotes, and
in its broad outlines, at least, is in agreement with Mr. Berge's conclusions. See,
BERGE, op. cit. supra note 122, at 99, 112-120. Findings of fact have not yet been
made in this suit nor in that of the United States.
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even the association as a mere convenient vehicle for carrying out the
recommendations arrived at by them. As a result rates were set not to
enable carriers to compete for traffic, but to prevent the forces of com-
petition and the trend to lower prices created by the depression of the
early 1930s from resulting in lower freight rates and a diminished
market value of railroad securities "and of industrial securities of busi-
nesses enjoying non-competitive advantages under the prevailing rate
structure."
1 42
If the facts be as the state contends it is obvious that the present rate
structure1 43 is not the result of carrier competition but of a monopolistic
collusion between the railroads contrary to the assumptions of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. The chief counsel for the defendant northern
railroads conceding that if the statements of fact by counsel for the state
"were in all points correct, a basis would be laid for the judgment of
condemnation" which the state seeks said the facts are otherwise.1 43 4
Since most of this inequality comes about through relations between
rates of different carriers, the inquiry must be directed at the reason-
ableness of the rates per se. While the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion is a valuable and much needed agency in the prevention and removal
of unreasonable discriminations due to locality, the problem is so complex
and the testimony introduced by the various interests affected is usually
so conflicting that it is not possible for the Commission to calculate with
Italics supplied.
The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1945 issued an order equalizing
class ratings throughout the country, and providing a uniform class rate east of
the Rocky Mountains, but the validity of the order is now being litigated. Class
Rate Investigation, 262 I. C. C. 447 (1945) ; and see, BFRGE, op. cit. supra note 122,
at 122-4.
14'a See, John Dickinson, Letter to the New York Herald Tribune, published in
the issue of December 8, 1946. Mr. Dickinson's contentions may be summarized as
follows:
The rapid industrialization of the South, and particularly of Georgia, disproves
the charge that the existing railroad rate structure prevents the South from be-
coming industrialized. Many Southern products carry as low a rate, or even lower
rates, to Northern markets than the products of the North. The Interstate Com-
merce Commission has not turned a deaf ear to the South but has for many years
been acceding to the requests of the South and ordering steadily decreasing rates
on Southern products shipped to Northern markets. The Northern railroads have
not insisted on higher rates from Southern than from Northern producing points,
but only that the northbound rates from Southern producing points be no lower
than southbound rates from Northern producing points to the Southern market,
which reciprocity has been opposed by the Southern interests who demand a higher
southbound rate to protect their industries against Northern competition. The
rate bureaus of which Georgia complains are only clearing houses for exchange of
information on rate problems and do not prevent a single railroad from taking
any independent action that it desires, either before or after it has fully canvassed
the subject. If the arrangements between railroads attacked by Georgia were
abolished we might return to conditions prevailing many years ago when a shipper
could not consign goods beyond the terminus of a single line, or else we might
be forced to government management of the railroads. To support the assertion
that existing railroad rates are not hampering the industrial development of the
South the following statement is made: "The figures are conclusive. Taking three
chief indices of industrial growth, namely: number of workers employed; total
wages paid, and value added by manufacture, the percentage increases shown by
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arithmetical exactness the "correct" relation between the rates. If this
were possible, correction of a discrimination complained of, may only
aggravate the condition of a shipper in a third locality who is not a
party to the proceeding and has no opportunity to present his case to
the Commission. The Commission, itself, has said that in these matters
it must proceed through trial and error, setting rates at the presently
apparent proper levels and holding new hearings when it appears that the
scales have not been tipped far enough or have gone clear over on the
other side.' 44
The Interstate Commerce Act was framed on the assumption that
carrier competition, not the Commission, would prevent most injustices
in rate relations. As Mr. Berge says :'45
"With respect to rates ... the function of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission has generally been misunderstood by the public. The Interstate
Commerce Act, as it now stands, makes it the duty of every common
carrier to initiate its own rates and to file them with the Commission.
The Commission in reviewing the rates thus made by the industry can-
not and does not ordinarily go behind the given data to consider whether
the rates are arrived at by agreement or compulsion or, in relatively rare
instances, open competition. Investigations conducted by the Depart-
ment of Justice indicate that more than 99 per cent of the rail rates
filed with the Commission become the 'lawful rates' without any review
by the Commission."
Carrier competition, subject to Commission supervision, is a far more
effective means than Commission investigation alone of combating un-
reasonable preferences to patrons in a given locality through the relation
of rates of different railroads. A competing carrier has an interest in
getting and keeping traffic which will keep it on the alert to discover
and meet lower rates by other carriers. Since the best the Commission
can do is trial and error, it seems probable that the trials of a competing
road would not produce any more serious errors. 146 Certainly, carrier
Georgia between 1931 and 1939 in each of these items were 32 per cent, 44 per
cent and 55 per cent, respectively, as against increases of only 19 per cent, 25 per
cent, and 22 per cent, in the Northeastern states; and of 21 per cent, 26'/ per
cent and 24 per cent in the country as a whole. The figures since 1939 would
be even more startling, but we must wait for them until the next census of
manufacturers."
It would thus seem that the controversy in the Georgia case has been reduced
to an issue of fact, the just determination of which must await presentation of
evidence. Among other things to be considered would be the possibility that such
industrial development as the South has experienced in recent years may be the
result of unreasonably low wages paid to off-set the handicap of unreasonably high
freight rates, and the percentages cited by Mr. Dickinson may reflect the rate of
recovery from the Great Depression rather than an actual gain in new industries.
1,, Rate Structure Investigation, 164 I. C. C. 619, 697 (1930).
, BERGE, op. cit. supra note 122, at 111.
16,The decision as to what is a sufficient difference to fairly require a dis-
crimination in its favor must be decided by the fallible mind of man.... The
decision as to the differences, too, must always be decided by man; and the gov-
ernment official in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and other countries of Europe
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competition offers a much speedier method of counteracting preferential
rates by other roads than a Commission hearing does. The solution
seems to be to restore active carrier competition and limit interference
therewith to cut-throat competition found to be such by the Commission
-a possible but greatly exaggerated danger-and to rates which are
discriminatory in relation to other rates charged by the same carrier and
which do not meet the test of the Texas and Pacific and East Tennessee
cases: (1) Are no lower than necessary to get the traffic; (2) do not
decrease the competitive abilities of the same carrier's other patrons; and
(3) are compensatory so as not to throw an added rate burden on the
same carrier's other patrons.
How to bring about this return to the sort of carrier competition
anticipated by the framers of the Act and protected by the decisions of
the Supreme Court construing the Act is difficult to say especially in
view of the financial control of the railroads by banks, insurance com-
panies and private investors whose principal interests are in non-carrier
businesses now concentrated in Official Territory. The Georgia suit in
the Supreme Court and that brought by the United States in the district
court in Nebraska are at least encouraging steps in that direction.
where there is state ownership of railroads, has caused even more complaint by
his rulings than has the manager of the private corporation in the United States."
Gerrit L. Lansing, Discrimination in Railroad Rates (1886) 28 Pop. Sci. MONTHLY
494.
[Vol. 25
